Taxes and Portfolio Choice: Evidence from JGTRRA's Treatment of International Dividends by Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
TAXES AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE:









We thank Lucas Davis, Clemens Sialm, and particularly Alan Auerbach and Jim Hines for helpful
discussions and comments; Barbara Angus, Alex Brill, Ed McClellan, Pam Olson and Phil West provided
invaluable perspective on the legislative history of JGTRRA.  Desai acknowledges the financial support
of the Division of Research of Harvard Business School. The views expressed herein are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Taxes and Portfolio Choice: Evidence from JGTRRA's Treatment of International Dividends
Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala




This paper investigates how taxes influence portfolio choices by exploring the response to the distinctive
treatment of foreign dividends in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA). 
JGTRRA lowered the dividend tax rate to 15% for American equities and extended this tax relief only
to foreign corporations from a subset of countries. This paper uses a difference-in-difference analysis
that compares US equity holdings in affected and unaffected countries. The international investment
responses to JGTRRA were substantial and imply an elasticity of asset holdings with respect to taxes
of -1.6.  This effect cannot be explained by several potential alternative hypotheses, including differential
changes to the preferences of American investors, differential changes in investment opportunities,
differential time trends in investment or changed tax evasion behavior.
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Taxes on assets differ substantially and have the potential to alter what assets investors 
hold, how they finance their investments and the types of accounts they choose for their 
investments. Assessing the efficiency consequences of these taxes requires measuring the 
sensitivity of portfolio choices to tax rates. As Poterba (2001, 2002) notes, empirical efforts to 
isolate how taxation influences portfolio choice have produced mixed results.  Investigating the 
relationship between cross-sectional heterogeneity in marginal tax rates and asset holdings is 
complicated by the incomplete nature of most household portfolios and because income levels 
can influence both risk preferences and marginal tax rates.  Investigating how portfolios change 
after tax reforms must overcome the possibility that such changes may reflect endogenous supply 
responses or other general equilibrium effects that can confound the influence of taxation on 
portfolio choices.   
This paper seeks to overcome these empirical difficulties by analyzing a tax reform that 
differentially changed the tax treatment of otherwise similar instruments in a manner that is 
unlikely to have produced any endogenous supply response.  Specifically, the Jobs and Growth 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) extended dividend tax relief to companies 
domiciled in only a subset of foreign countries, namely those with a suitable tax treaty with the 
US (hereafter referred to as “treaty countries”).  An examination of the international portfolio 
response of American investors to this tax change promises to illuminate whether taxation 
significantly influences portfolio choices.  Given that the tax reform only affected American 
investors, it is difficult to imagine that the reform stimulated a supply response by foreign firms 
of the sort that might otherwise confound such an analysis.   
JGTRRA can be interpreted as a natural experiment in which treaty countries constitute a 
treatment group, with equities held in those countries experiencing a reduced US personal tax 
rate relative to equities held in the control group of nontreaty countries.  This paper employs data 
on patterns of outbound U.S. foreign portfolio investment (FPI) from the Treasury International 
Capital (TIC) reporting system to investigate the responses of US investors to this reform. The 
analysis begins by investigating if treaty countries experienced a disproportionate increase in US 
equity FPI relative to non-treaty countries in the aftermath of JGTRRA.  This analysis reveals a   2
significant increase for treaty countries relative to non-treaty countries that corresponds to an 
elasticity of asset holdings with respect to taxes of about -1.6.  This estimated effect is robust to 
the inclusion of a number of control variables that measure changes in the quality of the financial 
markets in treaty versus nontreaty countries.   
Such an analysis leaves open the possibility that unobservable nontax factors correlated 
with treaty status resulted in a changed environment for equity FPI.  To test for this possibility, it 
is possible to compare equity FPI originating in the US with equity FPI originating in the rest of 
the world to see if similar patterns hold for non-US equity FPI.  This analysis indicates that non-
US equity FPI does not exhibit similar patterns, casting doubt on the alternative explanation that 
opportunities for equity portfolio investment changed in a manner correlated with treaty status.  
Similarly, it is possible that American investor preferences changed across treaty status around 
this time. Controlling for alternative forms of US investment – US debt FPI and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by US firms – does not change the baseline results. Finally, differences in 
underlying time trends in FPI going to treaty and nontreaty countries do not appear to explain 
these results, as cross-sectional analyses of annual changes in FPI show no differential changes 
for treaty countries, except in the period immediately around JGTRRA. 
A variety of other alternative explanations also cannot account for the results.  There is 
no evidence of a significantly distinctive stock market return environment in treaty countries. 
Excluding countries with recent (and hence potentially endogenous) tax treaties, transition 
economies where the dynamics of portfolio investment may be different, and countries that allied 
with the US in the 2003 Iraq war similarly does not affect the results.  One particularly important 
set of considerations in this setting is changed tax evasion behavior that is coincident with 
JGTRRA or triggered by it.  As discussed below, the fact that information sharing provisions 
were the dimension along which treaties were designated to be suitable suggests that such an 
alternative explanation is unlikely.  Moreover, excluding tax havens or treaty countries with low 
levels of tax compliance suggests that changed evasion patterns cannot explain the basic result.   
Beginning with Feldstein (1976), the empirical literature analyzing the effects of taxation 
on portfolio choice has typically used cross-sectional analyses of the link between either income   3
or estimates of the relevant marginal tax rate and observed portfolio choices.
1  Several studies, 
including King and Leape (1998), Hubbard (1985), Agell and Edin (1990) and Scholz (1994), 
emphasize the incomplete nature of most household portfolios and the need to separately isolate 
effects of taxes on the probability of owning assets and on portfolio shares.  This literature has 
typically emphasized the influence of taxation on the probability of asset ownership with only 
mixed evidence on the effects of taxation on portfolio shares.   
Poterba and Samwick (2002) analyze recent versions of the Survey of Consumer 
Finances and find significant effects for taxation on both ownership and allocation dimensions, 
but this effect varies substantially across asset types.  Such cross-sectional studies must ensure 
that other variables that influence portfolio choice are included, in order to avoid confounding 
the tax rate effects. Of particular concern is the role of income in both determining marginal tax 
rates and exerting an independent effect on portfolio allocation.  Poterba and Samwick (2002) 
attempt to address this issue by computing a “first dollar” marginal tax rate that excludes 
investment income, and undertake a number of robustness checks to ensure that their results are 
not driven by these income effects.   
As Poterba (2001) notes, tax reforms hold the promise of circumventing such concerns by 
investigating changes in portfolios to help control for unobservable factors that might cloud 
cross-sectional analyses.  Scholz (1994) employs the Survey of Consumer Finances panel from 
1983 and 1989 to investigate the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86).  TRA86 was a 
significant enough to generate strong predictions on portfolio changes across households.  Scholz 
(1994), however, finds limited evidence of changes in household portfolios.  Of course, 
hypothesized responses to such dramatic reforms can be confounded by supply responses or 
other general equilibrium effects (Poterba, 2001; 2002) as firms change issuance and payout 
decisions, especially for a reform as wide-ranging as TRA86.  Ideally, a tax reform with clear 
consequences for investor after-tax returns and with no effects on supply decisions would more 
conclusively isolate tax effects.   
                                                 
1 This literature uses a conceptual framework based on theoretical models of portfolio allocation in the presence of 
taxes (e.g. Domar and Musgrave, 1944; Auerbach and King, 1983).   4
JGTRRA’s changed treatment of international dividends provides an empirical setting 
that approximates this ideal.
2  First, as described below, the reform had clear consequences for 
American investor after-tax returns across countries.  Second, the division of countries into two 
separate groups was driven by regulatory concerns and was unrelated to future changes in 
investment opportunities or other regulatory efforts to change investment in these countries 
differentially.  Finally, given the relatively small share of their stocks held by American 
investors, it is unlikely that supply responses by foreign firms would be large. It is similarly 
unlikely that the effects of the reform on US investors’ portfolios would have been offset by 
clientele effects in asset markets. JGTRRA applied only to US investor returns, leaving non-US 
investor tax rates and asset demands unaffected.   
The previous literature has focused on portfolio composition at the household level. For 
this study, the nature of JGTRRA suggests that an analysis of aggregate FPI flows is the 
appropriate methodology. Implicitly, this involves using a representative agent approach that 
examines changes in the international equity portfolio of US investors in the aggregate. This 
aggregation comes at a considerable cost, as household level heterogeneity in marginal tax rates 
and firm-level heterogeneity in payout policy is obscured.  As discussed below, losing this 
heterogeneity is likely to bias against finding any results. On the other hand, this representative 
agent approach to the question of tax and portfolio choice allows the analysis to circumvent the 
econometric issues associated with the incomplete nature of most household portfolios.
3 
In addition to estimating the impact of taxes on portfolio choice in general, this paper also 
contributes to the literature on the taxation of international portfolio income. Taxes have been 
hypothesized to contribute to the limited nature of international diversification.  Black (1974) 
and Stulz (1981) present models where barriers to international investment are conceptualized as 
taxes and are used to explain patterns of “home bias.”  Despite this conceptual framing, the role 
                                                 
2 In a related vein, Chetty and Saez (2005) use JGTRRA to study how dividend paying behavior responds to taxes.  
For the difficulty in using large tax reforms to isolate behavioral responses, see the discussion of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 in Auerbach and Slemrod (1997).   
3 The approach used here – with its focus on patterns of investment rather than on explicit measures of household 
portfolios – is similar to the methodology employed in the literature on the effects of tax burdens on mutual fund 
inflows (e.g. Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002). The source of identification here is JGTRRA’s differential treatment 
of assets, rather than variations in the investment styles of mutual fund managers. The fundamental question being 
addressed, namely the sensitivity of investors to after-tax returns, is the same as that in the household portfolio 
choice literature.   5
of taxes in contributing to home bias has received little empirical attention.
4  As Graetz and 
Grinberg (2003) note, a greater emphasis of the effects of taxation on international portfolio 
flows is required to better inform tax policy in this increasingly important area. In particular, 
countries contemplating corporate tax integration reforms must consider potential distortions to 
international portfolio allocations; the results here indicate that such effects are likely to be 
quantitatively large.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 elaborates on the effects of taxes on FPI in the 
setting of JGTRRA.  Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methodology.  Section 4 
presents the results.  Section 5 discusses the implications and concludes.             
2.  JGTRRA’s Treatment of International Dividends 
Prior to JGTRRA, dividends were taxed as ordinary income, at a rate of 38.6% for 
taxpayers in the top tax bracket. JGTRRA stipulated that dividends would be taxed at the same 
rate as capital gains and reduced the tax rate on capital gains to a maximum of 15%. This lower 
rate for dividends applies to dividends paid by domestic corporations and by “qualified” foreign 
corporations for the years from 2003 to 2008. A foreign corporation is deemed to be “qualified” 
for this purpose if it satisfies one or more of three tests – the “Possessions Test,” the “Market 
Test,” and the “Treaty Test.”
5  Under the first test, corporations resident in a US possession (such 
as Puerto Rico) automatically qualify, as do corporations resident in certain former US territories 
that are treated as possessions for tax purposes. Under the second test, dividends from 
corporations whose shares are traded in the US are also eligible for the favorable dividend tax 
treatment. This includes, for instance, corporations that are cross-listed in the US, or whose 
shares are tradable in the US through American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). 
For all other securities, the “Treaty Test” establishes that a corporation resident in a 
country with which the United States has a tax treaty meeting certain criteria qualifies for the 
lower dividend tax rate. In particular, the corporation must be eligible for the benefits of the 
treaty, and the treaty must contain certain information-exchange requirements, and be deemed 
“satisfactory” by the US Treasury.  The IRS released a list of 52 countries that were deemed to 
                                                 
4 One exception to this is the analysis of trading strategies in Christoffersen et al. (2005). 
5 See Sheppard (2004), Sheppard and Harty (2004), and Wacker (2004) for more details.     6
satisfy the “Treaty Test”;
6 these countries are referred to below as “treaty” countries, while those 
excluded from the list are referred to as “nontreaty” countries.
7  
JGTRRA’s favorable tax treatment of dividends was applied to an extensive, but by no 
means exhaustive, subset of foreign corporations.  For instance, these 52 countries played host to 
82% of US outbound equity FPI holdings in 2001 (based on the full sample of 213 countries in 
the dataset used in this paper). Even so, a number of significant destinations for US investment – 
such as Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan – are excluded from the favorable 
tax treatment of dividends. As the empirical approach relies on a within-country comparison of 
responses to JGTRRA across the two groups of countries, the absolute amounts of investment 
are less important than the relative changes across the two groups of countries.  
JGTRRA’s distinction between treaty and nontreaty countries appears to reflect two 
concerns among policymakers.
8 Most importantly, the emphasis on information-sharing 
provisions was thought to help ensure that cash flows afforded relief were, in fact, truly 
dividends.  Second, there was some concern over allowing dividend tax relief to income that may 
not have been taxed at the corporate level.
9 Moreover, the use of treaty status was thought to be a 
relatively simple and administratively feasible approach to determining which countries would 
be eligible for the favorable tax rates.  For the purposes of this analysis, the clarity of the 
distinction and the fact that it remained fixed (with no changes to the list of treaty countries until 
2006) are important. Of particular significance is that the distinction appears to have been 
unrelated to future changes in investment opportunities, or to other regulatory efforts that may 
have affected investment patterns. 
                                                 
6 The initial distinction based on the presence of a suitable treaty was made in early 2003 and was featured in the 
press, including The Wall Street Journal, in the summer of 2003.  The IRS clarified the precise list of countries in 
October 2003 - see IRS Notice 2003-69 (“United States Income Tax Treaties That Meet the Requirements of Section 
1(h)(11)(C)(i)(II)”). These countries are also listed in Table 1. 
7 In principle, treaties can be revised to meet JGTRRA’s requirements.  In November 2006, the IRS issued Notice 
2006-101, adding Bangladesh, Barbados, and Sri Lanka to the list of favored countries; however, this occurred after 
the end of the sample period used in this paper. 
8 The legislative history is not altogether clear on the rationale for this distinction.  This discussion is based on 
exchanges with several policymakers involved in the process.  These exchanges suggest that the distinction was also 
partly an accident.  The initial version of the legislation only afforded relief to domestic corporations.  After an 
adverse reaction to this aspect of the proposal, the Treaty test was suggested as a simple way of covering most 
foreign investment without including all foreign corporations.   
9 Nontreaty status may have been thought to be a rough proxy for those countries with low or zero corporate tax 
rates. Although most tax havens are in the nontreaty category, many nontreaty countries have relatively high 
corporate tax rates, so it is not clear that there exists a clear correspondence between treaty status and corporate tax 
rates.   7
In this study, JGTRRA is conceptualized as a natural experiment that changed the 
personal tax treatment of assets located in treaty countries but not that of assets located in 
nontreaty countries. To clarify the effects of JGTRRA and the underlying empirical 
methodology, consider a representative US portfolio investor who faces the top US income tax 
rate (denoted t
US
P) and holds shares in a corporation resident in a foreign country F. Let r
F be the 
pretax rate of return in country F. The foreign corporation thus earns a pretax return r
F that is 
subject to F’s corporate tax (at rate t
F
C). The remaining income is paid out by the foreign 
corporation to its shareholders, including the US-based investor. These dividends would 
typically be subject to a withholding tax by country F (at rate t
F
W). In addition, the US personal 
tax applies to the investor’s dividend income (but with a foreign tax credit allowed for 
withholding taxes paid to F).  
To simplify the setup, assume, as is generally true in reality, that the foreign withholding 





10 Then, assuming 
that the foreign corporation pays out all its returns as dividends, the US investor would receive 
an after-tax return of: 








C)              (1) 
before JGTRRA, given the pre-2003 top rate of 38.6% on ordinary income. Now consider the 
impact of JGTRRA if F happens to be a treaty country: the US personal tax rate on dividends 
becomes 15%, and the investor’s after-tax return is thus:
11 








C)               (2) 
On the other hand, if F happens to be a nontreaty country, then t
US
P remains equal to the top rate 
on ordinary income. Under JGTRRA, this rate fell (albeit much less than did the rate for 
qualified dividend income) from 38.6% to 35%. Thus, the investor’s after-tax return would 
become: 








C)               (3) 
                                                 
10 Most withholding tax rates imposed by foreign countries on dividends paid to US shareholders are no higher, and 
often lower, than 15% - see Anderson (2006, Chart 9.1). Thus, withholding tax rates were a fortiori lower than t
US
P 
prior to JGTRRA. 
11 A few treaty countries impose withholding tax rates that exceed 15% - see Anderson (2006, Chart 9.1). For such 








C). Including these countries among 
the treaty countries merely creates a bias against the paper’s findings. Furthermore, in the empirical analysis below, 
reclassifying these countries as nontreaty countries does not affect the basic results.   8
A comparison of Equations (1)-(3) shows that the personal tax burden on stock of corporations in 
treaty countries fell substantially more than did the corresponding burden on stock of 
corporations in nontreaty countries.
12  
These equations also clarify that this prediction holds even in a setting where corporate 
taxes are fully capitalized into pretax rates of return, as in the model of Gordon (1986). Suppose 
that there is a worldwide after-corporate-tax rate of return r*. Even if t
F
C is fully capitalized – so 
that r
F = r*/(1 - t
F
C) – variations in t
US
P across countries will still affect US investors’ returns 
from holding assets in different countries. With respect to the capitalization of dividend taxes 
into stock prices, it is similarly unlikely that US personal taxes would be capitalized into the 
prices of foreign equities as US entities typically constitute a small fraction of investors in 
foreign stock markets.
13  
There are a number of caveats associated with the framework outlined above. First, some 
firms do not pay out all earnings as dividends. Even though these firms’ returns will be burdened 
by dividend taxes if they are expected to pay dividends at some point in the future, the expiration 
of JGTRRA’s provisions in 2008 implies that these dividends may not benefit from favorable tax 
treatment. To the extent that the returns from stock are derived as capital gains, this would 
simply make it more difficult to find an effect as there was no variation across countries for the 
reduced capital gain rate. In addition, the uncertainty over the duration of the tax break created 
by JGTRRA’s expiration in 2008 would also potentially weaken any finding.  
Second, the framework sketched above assumes a representative, top-bracket US 
investor. In reality, some US investors are in lower tax brackets, and much investment occurs 
through tax-exempt vehicles or in tax-advantaged accounts. The presence of such investors also 
creates a bias against finding any effect, and the estimated effect can be viewed as a lower bound 
                                                 
12 An alternative interpretation involves comparisons with the returns from investing in domestic US firms. For 
instance, let r
US be the pretax rate of return in the US and t
US







C); then, prior to JGTRRA, the US investor would be indifferent between investing in a US firm and a 
corporation resident in F. After JGTRRA, the investor would remain indifferent if F happens to be a treaty country. 
However, the investor would now strictly prefer to invest in a US corporation if F happens to be a nontreaty country. 
Under this interpretation, the nontreaty countries constitute a “treatment” group that experiences an increased 
personal tax rate relative to that for US assets, while the treaty countries constitute a “control” group for which the 
personal tax rate is unchanged relative to that for US assets. However, the substantive implications of the results (in 
terms of the relative changes in US holdings of assets in the two groups of countries, and the elasticity of asset 
holdings with respect to the personal tax rate) are identical under both interpretations of the natural experiment. 
13 For instance, Figure 1 shows that, for a typical country, US equity FPI holdings constitute no more than 5-10% of 
its aggregate stock market capitalization.   9
as it is averaged across all US investors. Third, the exclusion of certain countries under the 
“Treaty Test” may not matter in practice if the dividends from corporations resident in those 
countries qualify for favorable treatment under the “Market Test.”  Again, this would simply 
create a bias against finding any effect of JGTRRA on international portfolio choices.
14     
Finally, it is possible that observed responses in security holdings by American investors 
might reflect changed payout or stock issuance decisions in response to the tax cut. Endogenous 
changes in firms’ payout policies in response to JGTRRA are unlikely as US portfolio investors 
generally constitute a small fraction of foreign firms’ investors. If they did occur, however, they 
would also likely create a bias against the paper’s findings, as firms would presumably change 
payouts in a way that would mitigate the tax penalty. Endogenous issuance responses are 
similarly unlikely. Changes in issuance would also be reflected in aggregate market 
capitalization, which is included as a control.  
3.  Data and Empirical Specification 
The Treasury International Capital (TIC) system reports the portfolio holdings of foreign 
securities by US investors, based on periodic surveys of banks, other financial institutions, 
securities brokers and dealers.
15 The location of the holdings is defined for each of a large 
number of countries and territories; the data represent the portfolio holdings of foreign securities 
by US investors at the end of each of the following years: 1994, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 
2005. The data are divided into three categories – equity FPI (i.e. holdings of foreign stocks), 
long-term debt FPI, and short-term debt FPI (available only from 2001).
16 
  The TIC data are based on the survey responses of a wide range of financial institutions 
and securities brokers and dealers, and so are highly comprehensive. Of particular importance to 
this study is that the location of assets (i.e. the country in which the securities owned by US 
investors are issued) is likely to be reported very accurately.
17 In addition, the data include US 
                                                 
14 As described below, ADR securities are counted as foreign securities in the data employed here. 
15 These data are available at www.treas.gov/tic/ and are described in more detail in Bertaut, Griever and Tryon 
(2006). 
16 The firm-level data from TIC have previously been used to examine the determinants of US investors’ equity 
holdings in foreign firms (e.g. Ahearne, Griever and Warnock, 2004; Ammer et al., 2006); the country-level data 
have been used to analyze the role of corporate tax rates and corporate governance institutions on the location of US 
portfolio investment (Desai and Dharmapala, 2007). 
17 Several concerns have been raised for how this data source categorizes FPI into the U.S., in particular with respect 
to custodial arrangements.  This difficulty appears less relevant for the case of outbound FPI as there is no reliance   10
holdings of foreign assets through American Depositary Receipts (ADR’s). While there are some 
limitations of the data, particularly with respect to small investors,
18 the TIC data are the best 
available source of information on FPI by US investors. 
  The dependent variable in the basic specification is the log of equity FPI held by US 
investors in country i in year t, measured in millions of US$.  The independent variable of 
interest seeks to capture those observations (at the country-year level) for which the reduced 
dividend tax applies. Thus, it is an interaction between an indicator variable (Treatyi) for those 
countries listed as treaty countries in Table 1 and an indicator (PostJGTRRAt) for the years after 
the enactment of JGTRRA. As JGTRRA was applied to the 2003 tax year, the latter variable is a 
dummy for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005.
19 The basic empirical specification is thus: 
Log of Equity FPIit = β(Treatyi*PostJGTRRAt) + Xitγ + µi + νt + εit                  (4) 
The central hypothesis that Equation (4) tests is whether US equity FPI is higher in treaty 
countries (relative to nontreaty countries) following JGTRRA: i.e. that β > 0. The specification in 
Equation (4) also includes country fixed effects (represented by µi) and year effects (represented 
by νt); εit is the error term. 
  Xit is a vector of time-varying control variables. In the baseline specification, the 
following controls are included. The log of GDP per capita (in PPP terms, expressed in nominal 
US$) and the log of population are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
                                                                                                                                                             
on the reporting of other countries and all reporters are U.S. entities.  Bertaut, Griever and Tryon (2006, p. A63) 
argue that: “The country attribution of the portfolio asset surveys should be extremely accurate. The annual position 
surveys, by design, attempt to collect information by country of issuer . . . precisely identifying each security 
issuer’s country of residence – from information supplied by survey reporters as well as from commercial data 
sources – is a relatively straightforward task.” 
18 While the data achieve comprehensive coverage of US investors’ holdings through institutions and other reporting 
entities, they may not be as comprehensive for small individual investors’ non-institutional holdings of foreign 
assets (Bertaut, Griever and Tryon, 2006, p. A67). Such holdings, however, are likely to be relatively small in 
magnitude. Second, the data do not include stock swaps and cross-border derivatives positions (although data 
collection on the latter began in 2005). Finally, the country of location is defined as the legal residence of the entity 
issuing the securities, and may not correspond to the country where the associated “real” economic activity is carried 
out. Thus, US investors’ portfolio holdings in small offshore financial centers and tax havens are potentially difficult 
to interpret. However, most such countries are excluded from the estimating sample due to missing data, and (as 
described in Section 4 below) the results are robust to the exclusion of the remaining havens. 
19 Strictly speaking, the treatment countries to which the reduced dividend tax rate applies include not only the treaty 
countries in Table 1, but also US possessions and certain former US territories. However, no FPI data is available 
for US possessions, and missing data eliminates the former US territories from the estimating sample. Thus, the 
“Possessions Test” does not play any role in the empirical analysis.    11
Indicators (WDI) database.
20 These variables control for changes in countries’ affluence and 
size. The log of aggregate stock market capitalization (in nominal US$) controls for changes in 
the value and amount of equity available for US investors to hold in a given country.
21 As 
investment decisions may also be affected by stock market performance, an additional control 
variable is a total stock return index constructed by Morgan Stanley Capital International, and 
available through Thomson’s Datastream database.
22 The index measures annual total returns for 
each country’s stock market, assuming that all dividends are reinvested. In addition, a number of 
additional control variables are used in various robustness checks, as described in Section 4. 
  The data on equity FPI is available (for the years specified above) for 1259 country-year 
observations on 213 countries and territories. The majority of these observations involve zero or 
negligible amounts of US equity FPI.
23 Moreover, the control variables are not available for 
many of the observations. In particular, the coverage of the stock return index is limited to those 
countries with the largest stock market capitalization. Thus, the primary estimating sample is 
considerably smaller, with 291 observations for the 49 countries listed in Table 1. Of these 
countries, 38 are treaty countries and the other 11 are nontreaty countries. Summary statistics, 
using this sample, for the variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 2. This reduced 
sample includes most countries with substantial stock market activity. It also includes a 
reasonable mix of treaty and nontreaty countries, with several nontreaty countries that have 
substantial economies and levels of US investment. The sample also excludes most small tax 
havens and offshore financial centers, for which the interpretation of FPI is potentially 
problematic. Finally, because the sample excludes most countries with very small amounts of US 
equity FPI, the analysis is less subject to random variations in these values over time. 
  Figure 1 provides a simple descriptive perspective on the empirical test used in this 
paper. It shows the mean levels of US equity FPI, scaled by aggregate stock market 
                                                 
20 This is available at http://econ.worldbank.org. Note that while GDP (and certain other variables) are expressed in 
nominal terms, the specification includes year effects. 
21 As Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2006) argue, much of this aggregate market capitalization may be tied up in 
controlling blocks and unavailable for purchase by minority shareholders, especially in countries with weak investor 
protections. Investor protection changes little over time, and is essentially incorporated in the country fixed effect 
here. 
22 See www.mscibarra.com for a description of these country level stock returns indices. 
23 Zero values for equity FPI arise either because there is no equity FPI, or because values of FPI under $0.5 million 
are not specifically reported in the TIC data. In the analysis, the log of FPI is set equal to zero when FPI is zero. 
Note, however, that zero values of equity FPI are almost entirely absent among the countries in the primary 
estimating sample.   12
capitalization, in treaty and nontreaty countries before and after JGTRRA for the 49 countries 
listed in Table 1. Prior to JGTRRA, treaty countries had a somewhat larger level of US equity 
FPI, relative to their aggregate stock market capitalization. Following JGTRRA, this difference 
widened considerably, with FPI scaled by market capitalization in treaty countries increasing 
slightly and the corresponding ratio in nontreaty countries decreasing. This simple illustration is 
suggestive that the effects hypothesized above are indeed operative. 
4. Results 
4.1 Basic  Results   
In order to investigate the relevance of the hypothesized effect in the most general 
setting, the specification reported in Column 1 of Table 3 employs the full sample of 213 
countries and territories. This specification estimates Equation (4) with country and year effects, 
but with no control variables. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level are 
reported in this table and in all of the subsequent longitudinal analysis. The effect of JGTRRA on 
US equity FPI holdings in treaty countries (relative to nontreaty countries) is positive and highly 
significant.
24 Column 2 reports the results of the same specification, with the sample restricted to 
observations for which the stock return index is available. Again, the effect of JGTRRA is 
positive and significant. In Column 3, a baseline set of controls – GDP, population, aggregate 
market capitalization, and stock market returns – is introduced. This has little impact on the 
coefficient of interest, which remains positive and significant. 
  It is possible that financial market conditions may have changed differentially in treaty 
and non-treaty countries at the same time as JGTRRA. For example, changes in the quality and 
liquidity of financial markets in treaty and non-treaty countries may influence the speed of 
portfolio adjustment.  In order to address this possibility, the regression in Column 4 includes 
two relevant measures from an updated version of the Beck et al. (2000) database of financial 
variables:
25 the value of stocks traded in a given country in a given year, scaled by GDP, and the 
stock market turnover ratio (i.e. the value of stocks traded in a given country in a given year, 
scaled by stock market capitalization). The attractiveness of equity to US investors may also be 
                                                 
24 As was noted earlier, this sample includes a large number of zero values for equity FPI (which are treated as 
zeroes when taking the log of FPI).  Using a random-effects Tobit specification leads to similar results. Censoring of 
equity FPI at zero is not as much of a concern in the remainder of Table 3 as there is only one zero value of equity 
FPI in the sample used in Column 2. 
25 This is available at http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/tbeck   13
affected by changes in the volatility of stock returns. Thus, a measure of volatility is constructed 
using the Morgan Stanley stock return data.
26 Changes in the availability of domestic debt 
financing from a country’s banking sector may affect the issuance of new equity by that 
country’s firms. Thus, the ratio of financial deposits to GDP, also obtained from the updated 
version of the Beck et al. (2000) database, is included in the model as a proxy for financial 
depth. Changes in FPI may also depend mechanically on a country’s trade deficit; to control for 
this, the values of exports and imports relative to GDP are obtained from the World Bank’s WDI 
database. Finally, Desai and Dharmapala (2007) show that foreign countries’ corporate tax rates 
are an important determinant of the pattern of US equity FPI; thus, this variable is obtained from 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ Worldwide Summaries of corporate taxation for various years. 
Column 4 of Table 3 reports the results from a specification that includes these additional 
controls. The addition of these controls strengthens the estimated effect of JGTRRA in terms of 
both magnitude and significance with the size of the coefficient increasing from 0.649 in the 
baseline specification to 0.797.
27 As such, the estimated effect from the baseline regression does 
not appear to reflect other financial market conditions.  
The effect of JGTRRA is fairly large in magnitude, despite the various factors discussed 
in Section 2 that would tend to bias the estimate downwards. In the baseline specification, the 
estimated coefficient of 0.649 implies that US equity FPI holdings in the average treaty country 
rose by over 90%, relative to US equity FPI holdings in the average nontreaty country. The 
relative decrease in the dividend tax rate for corporations in treaty countries was also large (the 
rate for treaty countries fell from 38.6% to 15% while the rate for nontreaty countries fell to 35% 
resulting in a relative decrease of 57%). Consequently, the implied elasticity of equity holdings 
with respect to the dividend tax rate is about -1.6.
28  
                                                 
26 The volatility measure is computed using monthly data on dollar returns.  The standard deviation is an annualized 
measure based on monthly returns for a two year window, including the current year and the previous year.  
27 The result is unchanged if changes in the quality of a country’s communications infrastructure are controlled for, 
using either the number of telephone mainlines or the number of (fixed and mobile) telephone subscribers. Both 
variables are from the World Bank’s WDI dataset; however, the sample size is reduced due to missing data. 
28 An alternative approach to characterizing the magnitude of the effect is to calculate the elasticity of asset holdings 
with respect to investors’ net-of-tax share of returns. Prior to JGTRRA, a top-bracket US investor received 0.614 
cents after tax for each dollar of dividends paid by a corporation. As a result of JGTRRA, this net-of-tax share rose 
to 0.85 (an increase of 38.4%) for dividends paid by corporations based in treaty countries. The corresponding share 
for dividends paid by corporations based in nontreaty countries rose to 0.65 (an increase of 5.9%). Thus, the net-of-
tax share increased by 32.5% more for treaty countries (relative to nontreaty countries), while US equity FPI   14
This elasticity is large relative to some of the estimates in the literature on the 
responsiveness of portfolio shares to taxes. For instance, Poterba and Samwick (2002) find that 
the effect of a household’s marginal tax rate on its direct equity holdings is only statistically 
significant in some of their annual cross-sections and those implied elasticities are substantially 
smaller than those found here. On the other hand, the results in this paper are consistent with the 
estimates in Agell and Edin (1990).
29  The elasticity estimated in Table 3 is similar to the 
estimates of the sensitivity of FDI to foreign corporate tax rates (e.g. Desai, Foley and Hines, 
2003) and to the estimate of the elasticity of US equity FPI to foreign corporate tax rates in Desai 
and Dharmapala (2007).  As such, the measured response is large relative to some studies on 
portfolio choice but is consistent with results on how taxes influence cross-border capital flows. 
In addition to being large in magnitude, the response to JGTRRA’s treatment of 
international dividends also appears to have been rapid.  Results in Table 5 below indicate that 
the differential response of US equity FPI holdings in treaty countries was concentrated in 2003, 
with some additional adjustment possibly occurring in 2004 and with no subsequent reversal. 
While this represents a quick response, it appears reasonable given that equity holdings can be 
readily acquired and liquidated, that JGTRRA created a large tax incentive, and that relatively 
financially sophisticated investors are involved.  Nonetheless, this rapid response stands in 
contrast to the relatively slow portfolio adjustment process that is hypothesized (for example in 
Poterba, 2002) to account for the generally small portfolio choice effects of tax reforms that have 
been studied in the previous literature.   
4.2. Controlling  for  Unobserved  Changes in Investment Preferences of US Investors   
It is possible that the relative attractiveness to US investors of treaty and non-treaty 
countries diverged after JGTRRA for some unobserved reason unrelated to the tax reform. For 
instance, it is conceivable that American investors came to value the diversification opportunities 
afforded by treaty countries more than those of nontreaty countries around this time. If so, then it 
would be expected that this trend would have affected not only FPI by US equity portfolio 
                                                                                                                                                             
holdings in treaty countries increased in relative terms by over 90%. The implied elasticity of asset holdings with 
respect to investors’ net-of-dividend-tax share is thus about 2.8. 
29 Agell and Edin (1990), using Swedish data, find a tax elasticity of holdings of common stock that is comparable 
to the estimate here. They use an approach that combines responses along the extensive and intensive margins.  In 
contrast to much of the previous literature, the elasticity measured using JGTRRA is based on changes along the 
intensive margin in asset holdings.      15
investors, but also debt FPI by US bondholders and foreign direct investment (FDI) by US 
multinational firms.
30  
JGTRRA should not have differentially affected incentives to engage in debt FPI across 
treaty status; the top marginal tax rate on ordinary income (including interest income from debt 
FPI) fell from 38.6% to 35%, but this change did not differ across treaty and nontreaty countries. 
Similarly, the favorable dividend tax rates under JGTRRA apply to all US firms regardless of 
where their foreign investments may be located, so the tax reform should not have affected US 
firms’ incentives to engage in FDI differentially across treaty and nontreaty countries. As such, 
debt FPI and FDI should not be directly affected by JGTRRA’s treatment of international 
dividends and can be used as controls that capture otherwise unobservable changes in the 
investment climate for US investors.  
Data on FDI are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA);
31 the measure 
of FDI is the direct investment position, on a historical cost basis (in millions of US$) of US 
firms in each country in a given year.
32 Debt FPI is obtained from the TIC database and 
represents the long-term debt holdings of US portfolio investors in millions of US$.
33 These two 
controls are included in the specification in Column 5 of Table 3. Adding FDI and debt FPI as 
controls in the model simply strengthens the estimated effect of JGTRRA on equity FPI, in terms 
of both magnitude and significance, relative to the baseline specification in Column 3.
34  As 
such, it is unlikely that unobserved changes to American investment opportunities that are 
correlated with treaty status are driving the basic results. 
4.3.   Testing for Unobserved Changes in the Environment for Equity FPI   
  In addition to the possibility of differential changes in how American investors viewed 
the general investment climate between treaty and nontreaty countries, it is also possible that the 
                                                 
30 Equity FPI and FDI can be conceptualized as alternative channels through which US investors can achieve 
international diversification, by either buying foreign stocks or investing in US multinational firms that engage in 
FDI overseas (see Gordon and Jun (1993), Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999) and Desai and Dharmapala (2007)). 
31 This is available at http://www.bea.gov 
32 Note that the sample in Column 5 omits one observation with negative reported FDI; excluding such observations 
from the baseline specification in Column 3 leads to consistent results. 
33 Long-term debt is defined as having an original maturity of over one year. The TIC database also includes short-
term debt FPI, but this is not available for all years, so only long-term debt is used in the analysis. 
34 If equity FPI and FDI are chosen jointly, there may be some concern about simultaneity bias in the estimation of 
the coefficients in Column 5. However, it is reassuring that the results are very similar both with and without the 
FDI and debt FPI controls (comparing Columns 3 and 5).   16
environment for equity portfolio investment more specifically may have changed differentially 
for treaty and nontreaty countries after 2003. For example, changes to disclosure rules or to the 
legal rights available to minority shareholders may have been improved in treaty countries 
relative to nontreaty countries. To some extent, such changes would be reflected in the controls 
for stock market conditions that are included in the baseline specification. However, any 
unobserved changes in the climate for equity FPI cannot be tested for simply using US 
investment patterns, as they would not affect US debt FPI or FDI. However, any such changes 
would presumably be reflected in the patterns of equity FPI by non-U.S. portfolio investors. 
  While the TIC data is restricted to US investment, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
collects data on global portfolio holdings through its Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
(CPIS).
35 This dataset includes the aggregate equity holdings of foreign portfolio investors in 
each country; these holdings are also broken down by the country of origin of the investors. 
Thus, it is possible to compute non-US equity FPI holdings by simply subtracting US holdings  
from aggregate worldwide holdings in a given country in a given year. The CPIS data only 
covers the years from 2001 to 2005. Summary statistics for the CPIS data are reported in the 
lower panel of Table 2; apart from the difference in time periods, the TIC and CPIS data sources 
are highly consistent.  
Column 1 of Table 4 begins the analysis by reporting the results from the previous 
specification using CPIS data only to establish if these effects are evident in this shorter sample 
with slightly different data. The basic result from Table 3 continues to hold, with a positive and 
significant effect of JGTRRA. Column 2 of Table 4 reports the results from the same 
specification, but with the dependent variable replaced by non-US equity FPI.  If the estimated 
effect in Table 3 is truly a JGTRRA effect, then it would not be expected to hold for non-US 
investors. Conversely, if the result in Table 3 is driven by unobserved changes in the climate for 
equity FPI, then these changes should also be reflected in non-US equity FPI. As shown in 
Column 2 of Table 4, the coefficient on the interaction term for non-US equity FPI is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Thus, it appears unlikely that the estimated effect of JGTRRA on 
the location of US equity FPI is due to unobserved changes in the environment for equity FPI, 
rather than to the tax reform. 
                                                 
35 This dataset is available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm   17
4.4.  Testing for Differential Time Trends in US Equity FPI  
There still remains a class of alternative explanations for the paper’s main result that 
involve US equity FPI in treaty and nontreaty countries following different time trends. For 
example, it could be argued that US equity FPI has tended to grow over time due to increasing 
international financial integration, with all or most of the increase being directed towards treaty 
countries rather than nontreaty countries because of the more favorable investment climate of 
treaty countries.  
To explore this question further, Table 5 presents a series of cross-sectional regressions 
examining the extent to which annual changes in US equity FPI are related to countries’ treaty 
status.
36 For each pair of years in the dataset, the specification is: 
∆(Log of Equity FPI)i = α + βTreatyi + ∆Xiγ1 + Riγ2+ εi                      (5) 
where ∆(Log of Equity FPI)i is the difference between the log of US equity FPI in country i in 
year t and the log of US equity FPI in country i in year (t - 1), or the closest previous year for 
which data is available. Treatyi  is an indicator variable for those countries on the IRS list for tax-
favored status. ∆Xi is a vector of changes in the baseline set of control variables – the logs of 
GDP , population, aggregate market capitalization, and stock market returns, while Ri is a vector 
of regional dummies.
37 The constant term is represented by α and the error term is εi. 
  The basic idea underlying these regressions is that if differential time trends for treaty and 
nontreaty countries are driving the basic result, then the annual changes in US equity FPI should 
generally be higher for treaty countries than for nontreaty countries, even in years unaffected by 
the tax reform. In other words, it would be expected that β > 0, and that the effect is generally 
statistically significant across all cross-sectional analyses presented in Table 5. In fact, annual 
changes in US equity FPI are generally unrelated to countries’ treaty status, except in 2003, the 
year that JGTRRA was enacted and came into effect. In 2003, US equity FPI increased more in 
treaty countries than in nontreaty countries; in other years, however, there appears to be no 
significant difference in the changes in US equity FPI across treaty and nontreaty countries. This 
is consistent with a one-time portfolio reallocation towards equity issued in treaty countries as a 
                                                 
36 Note that Table 5 and all subsequent tables use the paper’s basic TIC dataset, rather than the CPIS data used in 
Table 4. 
37 These are based on World Bank classifications; the regions are Europe and Central Asia, Asia and the Pacific, the 
Americas, and the Middle East and North Africa, with Africa as the omitted category.   18
response to JGTRRA in 2003.
38 More generally, these results cast doubt on the alternative story 
based on differential time trends for treaty and nontreaty countries, as a distinctive trend for 
treaty countries is not apparent in the Table 5 results for years other than 2003.
39 
4.5  Testing for Changes in Stock Market Conditions in 2003 
Stock market conditions in treaty countries may have changed in 2003 in some 
discontinuous manner that is not captured by the various stock market control variables used in 
the basic analysis. While significant changes to issuance decisions or a significant valuation 
change in response to JGTRRA are unlikely given the scope of U.S. investment abroad, it is 
possible to conduct some simple tests to see if such effects are operative.  Table 6 reports a series 
of cross-sectional regressions that examine whether changes in stock market variables in 2003 
are related to countries’ treaty status. The stock market variables are market capitalization, 
market returns, volatility, the ratio of stock value traded to GDP, and the stock market turnover 
ratio. Generally, changes in these variables in 2003 are not significantly different for treaty 
countries relative to nontreaty countries. The treaty effect for the ratio of stock value traded to 
GDP is of borderline significance, but its sign is the opposite of that required to explain the basic 
result (i.e. the stock value traded fell in treaty countries relative to nontreaty countries). Thus, it 
does not appear that the paper’s central result is driven by differential changes in stock market 
conditions across treaty and nontreaty countries. 
4.6.   Testing for Influential Subsets of Countries and Changed Patterns of Tax Evasion  
  The previous analyses have considered the possibility that the findings in Table 3 are 
driven by systematic differences between treaty and nontreaty countries in terms of the 
investment preferences of American investors, the FPI investment climate, trends in investment 
generally and market conditions.  One final class of alternative explanations is that some other 
relevant classification of countries overlaps with treaty status, and that this might explain the 
                                                 
38 The only other year for which the treaty country variable is of comparable magnitude (albeit statistically 
insignificant) is 2004, which is consistent with some delayed portfolio response to JGTRRA. 
39 The most general approach to addressing alternative explanations along these lines is to add country-specific time 
trends to the model. When this is done, the estimated JGTRRA effect is no longer statistically significant. This result 
is likely attributable to the difficulty of separately identifying both country-specific time trends and the effect of 
JGTRRA. Given the short panel (with only 6 years of data) and the fact that all of the years affected by JGTRRA are 
in the latter half of the sample period, the JGTRRA effect can easily be confounded with an increasing time trend for 
treaty countries.  For this reason, the annual cross-sectional regressions may be more illuminating. Moreover, an 
increasing time trend in equity FPI in treaty countries would be expected to affect non-US as well as US FPI, but (as 
shown in Table 5) this appears not to be the case.    19
results in Table 3.  In this subsection, these possibilities are considered, with particular attention 
to changed patterns of tax evasion.  
The first three columns of Table 7 explore the possibility that the baseline results of 
Table 3 are driven by influential subsets of countries.  First, the estimating sample includes a 
number of formerly socialist transition economies, in which US FPI may have grown over time 
due to institutional changes and growing familiarity, rather than to JGTRRA.  Excluding 
transition economies from the sample leads to consistent results, as shown in Column 1 of Table 
8.
40  The signing of a tax treaty may also be in anticipation of significant increases in FPI: 
countries that have recently signed tax treaties with the US may be precisely those in which 
future US investment is expected to grow. Thus, Column 2 of Table 7 reports the results using a 
sample that excludes countries with tax treaties with the US signed after 1990.
41 The basic result 
is robust suggesting that the main finding is not driven by the possible endogeneity of tax 
treaties.
42  Finally, it is possible that US investors switched their portfolios towards countries that 
were part of the “coalition” involved in the 2003 Iraq war, and these may have been 
disproportionately treaty countries. The specification in Column 3 excludes “coalition” countries 
from the sample and this exclusion does not affect the basic result.
43 
There are two possible scenarios in which changes in evasion behavior may confound the 
paper’s results.
44  First, it is possible that there has been a decrease in tax evasion over time for 
reasons unrelated to JGTRRA (such as stronger enforcement). This may manifest itself in US 
investors who were previously engaging in evasion through tax haven investments abandoning 
attempts at evasion and switching their portfolios towards other countries, both treaty and 
nontreaty. As tax havens are predominantly nontreaty countries, this development may generate 
a spurious relative increase in FPI in treaty countries in the latter part of the sample period. There 
are few tax havens in the estimating sample, so this effect is unlikely to be large. Moreover, 
                                                 
40 Transition economies are defined as those classified by La Porta et al. (1999) as having “Socialist” legal origins. 
41 This is based on hand-collected data on tax treaty dates, kindly provided by Jim Hines. 
42 More generally, it should be noted that the distinction implemented by JGTRRA is not based entirely on the 
presence of a treaty, but partly on treaty status and partly on the presence of information-sharing provisions.  As 
such, some countries classified as nontreaty have treaties but these treaties do not have suitable information-sharing 
provisions.   
43 This test uses the list of coalition countries in the White House press release of March 27, 2003 (available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030327-10.html). 
44 For a discussion of how investors may evade home country taxes on returns from FPI, see for example Gordon 
and Jun (1993) and Huizinga and Nicodeme (2004).   20
excluding the remaining tax havens (as defined in Dharmapala and Hines (2006, Table 1, 
Column 3)) from the sample does not affect the basic result, as shown in Column 4 of Table 7. 
The annual cross sectional results presented in Table 5 are also inconsistent with this hypothesis 
of a secular change in tax evasion channeling more investment towards treaty countries.   
  Second, it is possible that FPI in treaty countries was mismeasured prior to JGTRRA due 
to unreported investments in treaty countries being used for tax evasion purposes. The reduced 
tax rates established by JGTRRA may have allowed these investments to emerge into “the 
open.”  If this were the case, then the results attributed to a behavioral response to JGTRRA 
would only represent a correction of mismeasurement.  It is inherently difficult to test for this 
possibility, given the inability to measure the hidden investment prior to JGTRRA. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to test one prediction that would emerge from such an alternative explanation of the 
results.  If assets in treaty countries were merely becoming visible, the effects documented 
previously should be reliant on those countries where such evasion was most likely. This 
characteristic can be measured using the tax compliance index in La Porta et al. (1999).  
Originally constructed by the World Economic Forum, this index represents the extent of tax 
compliance in 1995 in a cross-section of countries. Excluding those treaty countries that have tax 
compliance indices one standard deviation or more below the treaty country mean does not 
change the basic result, as shown in Column 5 of Table 7.   
More generally, it should be noted that it is unlikely that investors would have engaged in 
evasion before JGTRRA through the purchase of stock in treaty countries. The treaty countries 
are defined precisely in terms of having  strong information-exchange provisions in their tax 
treaties with the US; in addition, most of them impose positive withholding taxes on dividends 
(e.g. Anderson, 2006, Chart 9.1), which reduce the benefits from evasion, and also generate 
information that may increase the probability that the evasion of US tax is subsequently detected. 
To the degree that evasion is operative, it appears more reasonable to assume that evasion would 
occur through investment in tax haven countries with weak or nonexistent information-exchange 
provisions and zero withholding taxes, and that the effect of reduced evasion after JGTRRA 
would manifest itself in the form of a transfer of funds from havens to treaty countries. Such a 
transfer is part of the JGTRRA effect that this paper seeks to estimate, and represents one of the   21
channels through which JGTRRA increased US equity FPI in treaty countries, rather than being 
an alternative explanation for the basic result.
45 
5. Discussion  and  Conclusion 
  This paper establishes a quantitatively large effect of JGTRRA’s differential treatment of 
foreign-source dividends on US investors’ portfolio choices. It shows that in an empirical setting 
where an exogenous tax change is accompanied by limited scope for endogenous supply 
responses, it is possible to identify large and significant effects of taxes on portfolio choices. In 
particular, US investors’ holdings of lightly-taxed foreign equities increased significantly in a 
manner that is consistent with an implied elasticity of asset holdings with respect to the tax rate 
of approximately -1.6.  This elasticity is considerably larger than most estimates of the 
responsiveness of portfolio shares to tax rates.  
  These results suggest several avenues for further research.  First, while taxes have been 
discussed in the theoretical literature on home bias, there has been limited empirical work on 
their role in limiting gains from international diversification.  These results suggest that taxes can 
play in a large role in shaping international portfolio choices.  Second, JGTRRA’s provisions 
may have changed the incentives for cross-border listings and ADRs.  While such potential 
responses would not confound the results here, they may have provided for interesting changes 
to the ADR market.  Third, exploring the heterogeneity of institutional investor responses to 
JGTRRA’s treatment of international dividends may illuminate how different types of 
institutions respond to tax incentives.  
  This paper also has implications for tax policies that seek to achieve corporate tax 
integration.  Integration has been widely supported by economists as a means of reducing 
distortions to firm payout and financing decisions, as discussed in Hubbard (1993). If dividend 
relief is not fully extended to foreign dividends, corporate tax integration may give rise to 
significant distortions in international portfolios with consequent welfare losses. The results in 
this paper show that these international portfolio effects can be quantitatively large.  
                                                 
45 It is also unlikely that investors simply moved equity held in nontreaty countries to holding companies in treaty 
countries. JGTRRA specifically denies its favorable tax treatment of dividends to foreign personal holding 
companies, foreign investment companies, and passive foreign investment companies, even if they are located in 
treaty countries (Sheppard, 2004). Thus, relocating assets from nontreaty to treaty countries would involve some real 
cost in terms of changed diversification patterns or various other frictions.   22
References 
 
Agell, J., and P.-A. Edin (1990) “Marginal Taxes and the Asset Portfolios of Swedish 
Households” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 92, 47-64. 
Ahearne, A., W. L. Griever and F. E. Warnock (2004) “Information Costs and Home Bias: An
  Analysis of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Equities” Journal of International Economics, 62,
 313-336. 
Ammer, J., S. B. Holland, D. C. Smith and F. E. Warnock (2006) “Look at Me Now: What
  Attracts U. S. Shareholders?” NBER Working Paper #12500. 
Anderson, R. E. (2006) Analysis of United States Income Tax Treaties, WG&L Publishing. 
Auerbach, A. J., and M. A. King (1983) “Taxation, Portfolio Choice, and Debt–Equity Ratios: A 
General Equilibrium Model” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 587–609. 
Auerbach, A. J. and J. Slemrod (1997) “The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 589-632. 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and R. Levine (2000) “A New Database on Financial Development
 and  Structure”  World Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605. 
Bergstresser, D. B. and J. M. Poterba (2002) “Do After-Tax Returns Affect Mutual Fund
 Inflows?”  Journal of Financial Economics, 63, 381-414. 
Bertaut, C., W. L. Griever and R. W. Tryon (2006) “Understanding U.S. Cross-Border Securities
 Data”  Federal Reserve Bulletin, 92, A59-A75. 
Black, F. (1974) “International Capital Market Equilibrium with Investment Barriers” Journal of
 Financial  Economics, 1, 337-352. 
Chetty, R. and E. Saez (2005) “Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behavior: Evidence from the
  2003 Dividend Tax Cut” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 791-834. 
Christoffersen, S. E. K., C. Geczy, D. K. Musto, and A. V. Reed (2005) “Cross-border
  Dividend Taxation and the Preferences of Taxable and Non-taxable Investors: Evidence
 from  Canada”  Journal of Financial Economics, 78, 121-144. 
Desai, M. A., C. F. Foley and J. R. Hines Jr. (2003) “Chains of Ownership, Tax Competition,
  and the Location Decisions of Multinational Firms” in H. Herrmann and R. Lipsey, eds.
  Foreign Direct Investment in the Real and Financial Sector of Industrial Countries
  Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 61-98. 
Desai, M. and D. Dharmapala (2007) “Taxes, Institutions, and Foreign Diversification
  Opportunities” NBER Working Paper #13132. 
Dharmapala, D. and J. R. Hines, Jr. (2006) “Which Countries Become Tax Havens?” NBER
  Working Paper #12802. 
Domar, E. D. and R. A. Musgrave (1944) “Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 58, 388-422.   
Errunza, V., K. Hogan and M-W. Hung (1999) “Can The Gains From International 
Diversification Be Achieved Without Trading Abroad?” Journal of Finance, 54,       
2075-2107.   23
Feldstein, M. (1976) “Personal Taxation and Portfolio Composition: An Econometric Analysis”
  Econometrica, 44, 631–649. 
Gordon, R. H. (1986) “Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy” American
 Economic  Review, 76, 1086-1102. 
Gordon, R. H. and J. Jun (1993) “Taxes and the Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate
  Equity” in A. Giovannini, R. G. Hubbard and J. Slemrod (eds.) Studies in International
 Taxation, University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 13-44. 
Graetz, M. and I. Grinberg (2003) “Taxing International Portfolio Income” Tax Law Review, 56,
 537-586. 
Hubbard, R. G. (1985) “Personal Taxation, Pension Wealth, and Portfolio Composition” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 67, 53–60. 
Hubbard, R. G. (1993) “Corporate Tax Integration: A View from the Treasury Department”
  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, 115-132. 
Huizinga, H. and G. Nicodeme (2004) “Are International Deposits Tax-Driven?” Journal of
 Public  Economics, 88, 1093-1118. 
Kho, B-C., R. Stulz, and F. E. Warnock (2006) “Financial Globalization, Governance, and the
  Evolution of the Home Bias” NBER Working Paper #12389. 
King, M. A., and J. I. Leape (1998) “Wealth and Portfolio Composition: Theory and Evidence” 
Journal of Public Economics, 69, 155–193. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1999) “The Quality of
 Government”  Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 15, 222-279. 
Poterba, J. M. (2001) “Taxation and Portfolio Structure: Issues and Implications” in L. Guiso, M. 
Haliassos, and T. Jappelli (eds.) Household Portfolios MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 103-
142. 
Poterba, J. M. (2002) “Taxation, Risk-Taking and Portfolio Behavior” in A. Auerbach and M.
 Feldstein,  Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3 (Amsterdam: North Holland),
  1109-1171.   
Poterba, J. M., and A. A. Samwick (2002) “Taxation and Household Portfolio Composition: US 
Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s” Journal of Public Economics, 87, 5-38. 
Scholz, J. K. (1994) “Tax Progressivity and Household Portfolios: Descriptive Evidence from 
the Surveys of Consumer Finances” in J. Slemrod (ed.), Tax Progressivity and Income 
Inequality, Cambridge University Press, New York, 219-267. 
Sheppard, H. E. (2004) “Reduced Tax Rates on Foreign Dividends under JGTRRA: Ambiguities
 and  Opportunities”  Journal of International Taxation, 15, 14-27, 62. 
Sheppard, H. E., and S. A. Harty (2004) “Tax Treatment of Foreign Dividends under JGTRRA:
  Ambiguities and Opportunities” Journal of International Taxation, 15, 20-27.  
Stulz, R. (1981) “On the Effects of Barriers to International Investment” Journal of Finance, 36,
 923-934.   24
Wacker, R. F. (2004) “US Taxation of International Dividends under JGTRRA” The
  International Tax Journal, 30, 19-34. Notes: The figure provides the average ratio of aggregate U.S. Equity FPI to Market Capitalization for Treaty and 
Nontreaty countries for the years prior and subsequent to JGTRRA.  This ratio is a weighted average across countries 
in each year and then averaged across the three years prior to JGTRRA that are available in the sample (1994, 1997 
and 2001) and subsequent to JGTRRA (2003, 2004 and 2005).  


















Ratio of US Equity FPI to Market CapitalizationNontreaty Countries
Australia Greece Netherlands Switzerland Argentina
Austria Hungary New Zealand Thailand Brazil
Belgium India Norway Turkey Chile
Canada Indonesia Pakistan United Kingdom Colombia
China Ireland Philippines Venezuela Hong Kong
Czech Republic Israel Poland Jordan
Denmark Italy Portugal Malaysia
Egypt Japan Russia Peru
Finland Korea (South) South Africa Singapore
France Mexico Spain Sri Lanka
Germany Morocco Sweden Taiwan
Cyprus Kazakhstan Romania Tunisia
Estonia Latvia Slovak RepublicUkraine
Iceland Lithuania Slovenia
Jamaica Luxembourg Trinidad and Tobago
Table 1: List of Sample Countries
Treaty Countries
Treaty Countries (Not in the Sample)
Note: The sample is based on the availability of data on US equity FPI and the baseline control variables (notably, 
the stock market return index, which is only available for a limited set of countries).  “Treaty” countries are defined 
based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Notice 2003-69 (“United States Income Tax Treaties That Meet the 
Requirements of Section 1(h)(11)(C)(i)(II)”), issued in October, 2003, and available at: http://www.irs.gov/irb/2003-
42_IRB/ar09.html.  The sample is based on the availability of data on US equity FPI and the baseline control 
variables.Variable Mean Standard Deviation No. of Observations
Primary (TIC) Dataset:
Log of US Equity FPI 8.743 2.317 291
Log of US Long-term Debt FPI 7.797 2.211 291
Log of US FDI 9.051 1.699 268
Log of GDP per capita (PPP) 9.420 0.836 284
Log of Population 17.150 1.372 285
Log of Aggregate Market Capitalization 25.360 1.712 284
Log of Stock Market Return Index 6.539 1.504 291
Volatility of Stock Market Returns 0.253 0.115 287
Ratio of Stock Market Value Traded to GDP 0.493 0.613 291
Stock Market Turnover Ratio 0.720 0.695 290
Ratio of Financial Deposits to GDP 0.656 0.395 279
Exports as a % of GDP 39.080 27.420 247
Imports as a % of GDP 38.450 26.250 247
Corporate Tax Rate 30.090 7.091 280
(Treaty=1)*(Post-JGTRRA) 0.392 0.489 291
IMF CPIS Dataset:
Log of Non-US Equity FPI 9.226 2.300 235
Log of US Equity FPI 8.877 2.328 235
Log of GDP per capita (PPP) 9.504 0.830 235
Log of Population 17.210 1.353 235
Log of Aggregate Market Capitalization 25.530 1.645 235
Log of Stock Market Return Index 6.627 1.547 235
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Notes: US equity FPI is from the TIC dataset, and measures US investors' equity portfolio holdings in millions of US$. 
Long-term debt FPI is also from the TIC dataset, and measures US investors debt portfolio holdings with a maturity 
greater than one year. US FDI is the direct investment position of US firms in millions of US$ (from the BEA dataset). 
GDP per capita (in US$, in PPP terms), population and aggregate market capitalization are from the World Bank’s WDI 
database. The stock market return index is drawn from Datastream and is based on MSCI country dollar indices. The 
volatility of stock market returns is constructed by annualizing a standard devation based on the trailing 24 months of 
monthly returns.  The ratio of stock market value traded to GDP, the stock market turnover ratio, and the ratio of 
financial deposits to GDP are taken from an updated version of Beck et al. (2000). Exports and imports as a % of GDP 
are from the World Bank’s WDI database. The corporate tax rate is the top statutory corporate rate (from the PWC 
Worldwide Summaries).  (Treaty=1)*(Post-JGTRRA) is an interaction between an indicator variable for those countries 
listed as treaty countries in Table 1, and an indicator for the years after the enactment of JGTRRA.  For the IMF CPIS 
Dataset: US equity FPI is from the IMF's CPIS dataset, and measures US investors' equity portfolio holdings in millions 
of US$. Non-US equity FPI is also from the IMF's CPIS dataset, and is obtained by subtracting US equity FPI holdings 
from worldwide equity FPI holdings. All other variables are as defined above.Dependent Variable: 
0.758 *** 0.691 ** 0.649 ** 0.797 *** 0.798 ***
(0.166) (0.332) (0.257) (0.283) (0.265)
1.635 * 1.737 2.430 *
(0.961) (1.380) (1.427)
Log of Population 1.544 0.778 0.656
(2.449) (1.653) (1.534)
0.714 *** 0.300 0.561
(0.119) (0.358) (0.343)




















Country and Year Effects? YYYYY
Sample Period 1994-2005 1994-2005 1994-2005 1994-2005 1994-2005
Observations 1259 291 283 225 260
Countries 213 49 48 45 47
R-squared 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.97
(Treaty=1)* (Post-JGTRRA)
Volatility of Stock Market 
Returns
Log of Stock Market Return 
Index
Log of Aggregate Market 
Capitalization
Log of GDP per capita (PPP)
Exports as a % of GDP
Ratio of Financial Deposits to 
GDP
Stock Market Turnover Ratio
Ratio of Stock Market Value 
Traded to GDP
Log of US Long-Term Debt 
FPI
Log of US FDI
Corporate Tax Rate
Imports as a % of GDP
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of US equity FPI (from the TIC dataset) for each available year.  (Treaty=1)* (Post-JGTRRA) is an 
interaction between an indicator variable for those countries listed as treaty countries in Table 1, and an indicator for the years after the 
enactment of JGTRRA.   Log of GDP per capita (in US$, in PPP terms), log of population and log of aggregate market capitalization are 
from the World Bank’s WDI database.  The log of the stock market return index is drawn from Datastream and is based on MSCI country 
dollar indices. The volatility of stock market returns is constructed by annualizing a standard devation based on the trailing 24 months of 
monthly returns.  The ratio of stock market value traded to GDP, the stock market turnover ratio, and the ratio of financial deposits to GDP 
are taken from an updated version of Beck et al. (2000).  Exports and imports as a % of GDP are from the World Bank’s WDI database.  
The corporate tax rate is the top statutory corporate rate (from the PWC Worldwide Summaries). The log of US FDI is the direct investment 
position of US firms (from the BEA dataset).  Log of US long-term debt FPI is from the TIC dataset. Column 1 employs the full sample of 21
Table 3: The Effect of JGTRRA on the Location of US Equity FPI
Log of US Equity FPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
countries and territories.  In column 2 the sample is restricted to observations for which the stock return index is available. In Column 5, 1 
observation with negative FDI is omitted. Robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent Variable:
(Treaty=1)*(Post-JGTRRA) 0.339 ** 0.199
(0.151) (0.152)
Log of GDP per capita (PPP) 1.028 2.105 *
(1.310) (1.119)




Log of Stock Market Return Index 0.677 *** 0.406 ***
(0.154) (0.154)
Country and Year Effects? Y Y




Log of Aggregate Market 
Capitalization 
Table 4: The Effect of JGTRRA on Non-US Equity FPI
Notes: The dependent variables are the log of US equity FPI and non-US equity FPI (from the IMF CPIS dataset) for 
each available year.  (Treaty=1)* (Post-JGTRRA) is an interaction between an indicator variable for those countries 
listed as treaty countries in Table 1, and an indicator for the years after the enactment of JGTRRA.   Log of GDP per 
capita (in US$, in PPP terms), log of population and log of aggregate market capitalization are from the World Bank’s 
WDI database.  The log of the stock market return index is drawn from Datastream and is based on MSCI country dollar 
indices. Robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.
(1) (2)
Log of US Equity FPI Log of Non-US Equity FPIDependent Variable: 
Treaty (=1) -0.260 0.146 0.351 ** 0.269 0.013
(0.319) (0.292) (0.164) (0.203) (0.137)
-0.871 2.447 * 1.511 -1.075 0.206
(2.402) (1.402) (1.666) (0.994) (1.931)
-0.451 2.118 -7.123 13.184 -1.329
(3.139) (2.430) (6.234) (10.145) (9.322)
0.928 *** 0.291 -0.143 0.311 0.143
(0.105) (0.405) (0.196) (0.233) (0.171)
-0.438 * 1.193 *** 0.739 ** 0.620 * 0.617 *
(0.245) (0.329) (0.308) (0.339) (0.362)
Constant 1.107 * -0.500 0.136 -0.145 0.158
(0.618) (0.508) (0.310) (0.216) (0.218)
Regional Dummies? YYYYY
Observations 45 47 48 48 47
R-squared 0.76 0.65 0.46 0.39 0.54
Change in Log of Aggregate 
Market Capitalization
Change in Log of Stock 
Market Return Index
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log of US equity FPI (from the TIC dataset) for each of the periods given.  Treaty=1 is 
an indicator variable for those countries listed as treaty countries in Table 1.  Log of GDP per capita (in US$, in PPP terms), log of 
population and log of aggregate market capitalization are from the World Bank’s WDI database.  The log of the stock market return 
index is drawn from Datastream and is based on MSCI country dollar indices. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 5: Annual Changes in US Equity FPI
Change in Log of GDP per 
capita (PPP)
Change in Log of Population
(5)
Change in 
Log of US 
Equity FPI 
from 1994 to 
1997
Change in 
Log of US 
Equity FPI 




Log of US 
Equity FPI 




Log of US 
Equity FPI 
from 2001 to 
2003
Change in 
Log of US 
Equity FPI 
from 2003 to 
2004Dependent 
Variable: 
Treaty (=1) 0.075 0.092 -0.715 -0.167 * -0.001
(0.172) (0.130) (0.549) (0.098) (0.189)
Constant 0.575 *** 0.532 *** 2.040 *** 0.198 * 0.054
(0.172) (0.130) (0.549) (0.098) (0.189)
Regional Dummies? YYYYY
Observations 48 49 48 49 49
R-squared 0.27 0.12 0.28 0.17 0.01
Table 6: Annual Changes in Stock Market Conditions around JGTRRA
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in the log values from 2001 to 2003 of the following stock market 
variables: market capitalization, market returns, volatility, the ratio of stock value traded to GDP, and the stock market 
turnover ratio.   Treaty=1 is an indicator variable for those countries listed as treaty countries in Table 1.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(5)
Change in 




Log of Stock 
Return Index















0.662 ** 0.714 ** 0.698 ** 0.740 ** 0.705 **
(0.283) (0.319) (0.310) (0.287) (0.295)
1.959 2.255 1.631 1.908 * 1.861
(1.470) (1.787) (1.149) (1.015) (1.502)
1.268 2.016 1.435 0.951 1.576
(2.578) (2.969) (3.705) (2.682) (2.767)
0.673 0.567 0.698 *** 0.696 *** 0.628 **
(0.428) (0.349) (0.135) (0.128) (0.316)
0.325 0.447 0.431 * 0.339 ** 0.409 *
(0.333) (0.282) (0.223) (0.162) (0.241)
Country and Year Effects? YYYYY
Sample Period 1994-2005 1994-2005 1994-2005 1994-2005 1994-2005
Observations 253 194 187 255 241
Countries 43 33 32 43 41
R-squared 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96

















Log of Aggregate Market 
Capitalization
Table 7: Tests for Influential Subsets of Countries and Changed Patterns of Tax Evasion
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of US equity FPI for each available year.  (Treaty=1)* (Post-JGTRRA) is an interaction 
between an indicator variable for those countries listed as treaty countries in Table 1 and an indicator for the years after the 
enactment of JGTRRA.  Log of GDP per capita (in US$, in PPP terms), log of population and log of aggregate market capitalization 
are from the World Bank’s WDI database.  The log of the stock market return index is drawn from Datastream and is based on 
MSCI country dollar indices.  Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.
(5)







with Low Tax 
Compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4)